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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

INES C. FOWLER,
PlaintiffRespondent,
Case No. 14399
HAROLD W. TAYLOR, dba
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES,
DefendantAppellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case in which Respondent seeks to
recover from Appellant the reasonable value of services
rendered as a real estate broker pursuant to an implied
agreement.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following a trial to the Court sitting without
a jury, the Court awarded Respondent judgment against
Appellant on Respondent's first cause of action in the
amount of $9,715.25 as a real estate broker's commission.
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The Court also awarded Respondent judgment against
Appellant on Respondent's second cause of action in
the additional amount of $1,373.75 for a real estate
sales commission, and Respondent's costs of court
in the amount of $46.00.

This appeal contests only

that portion of the judgment awarding Respondent
$9,715.25 for a real estate broker's commission pursuant to Respondent's first cause of action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks:
(1) Reversal of that portion of the judgment
ordering that Respondent recover from Appellant a real
estate broker's commission in the amount of $9,715.25
pursuant to Respondent's first cause of action, and a
judgment in his favor of no cause of action as a matter
of law; or
(2) An order reducing the amount of such
recovery to zero; or
(3) An order reducing the amount of such
recovery to $250.00; or
(4) An order reducing the amount of such
recovery to $1,965.25; or
(5) A new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Official Report of Proceedings in the
Trial Court will be referred to throughout this Brief
by the letter "T." followed by the number of the
specific page or pages referred to.

Exhibits will be

referred to as "Ex." followed by the number of the
specific exhibit or exhibits referred to.

The defendant-

appellant and the plaintiff-respondent will be referred
to throughout as "Appellant" and "Respondent,11 respectively.
Respondent was first licensed as a real
estate salesman in Utah in November of 1967, and was
so licensed continually thereafter until January 1,
1973.

T. 26, 29, 84.

In 1971, Respondent took and

passed the Utah Real Estate Broker's Examination, but
did not activate her real estate broker's license at
that time.

T. 29.

In September of 1971, Respondent

went to work for Treasure Mountain Corporation as a
real estate salesman.

T. 29.

Appellant was first licensed as a real estate
salesman in Utah in 1958, and became the director of
real estate sales for Treasure Mountain Corporation
in July of 1972.

At that time, Appellant became Respond-

ent's supervisor in the Treasure Mountain Corporation
sales office.

T. 144, 145.

In August of 1972, Appellant
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Appellant could qualify for his own Utah real estate
broker's license.

Mr. Monson indicated that he was

willing to so broker for Appellant.

Mr. Monson was

willing to so act at no charge to Appellant.

T. 80,

81, 111.
Prior to December 20, 1972, Appellant and
Treasure Mountain Corporation officials entered into
negotiations to have Appellant act as an independent
contractor for the purpose of marketing the subject
real estate securities.

T. 45, 46, 147, and Ex. 7, 12.

Prior to December 20, 1972, Respondent knew
that Treasure Mountain Corporation and Appellant
intended to enter into an agreement pursuant to which
Treasure Mountain Corporation would retain Appellant
to act as an independent contractor for the purpose
of marketing the subject real estate securities, and
I
that the aforesaid securities registration was being
amended accordingly.

Respondent also knew that Appel-

lant was to receive a total commission of 3.57o on all
i

sales made by him and his sales personnel, of which
2.57o would be paid to the salesman making the sale
and 17> would be retained by Appellant.

T. 35, 69-72,

and Ex. 7.
Prior to December 20, 1972, Respondent knew
that even though she held a license as a securities
salesman and a license as a real estate salesman, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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even though Appellant held a license as a securities
broker-dealer, she still would not be able to sell
any of the subject real estate securities as one of
Appellant's sales personnel unless she or someone
else acted as a real estate broker for Appellant's
sales organization, and that both a real estate broker's
license and a securities broker-dealer's license were
necessary for Appellant's sales organization in order
for her to make any sales of the subject real estate
securities.

T. 85, 87.

Prior to December 20, 1972, Respondent and
other salesmen in Appellant's sales organization had
been waiting a considerable amount of time for the
subject real estate securities to be effectively
registered as securities and for all sales personnel
to be properly licensed to sell.

T. 110.

Prior to December 20, 1972, in addition to
Respondent, another of the real estate salesmen in
Appellant's sales organization was eligible to activate
his real estate broker's license.

T. 152.

On December 20, 1972, Appellant asked if he
could "use" Respondent's real estate broker's license
and requested her to activate such license with the
Real Estate Division of the Utah Department of Business
Regulation.

Respondent agreed to Appellant's request,

whereupon Appellant completed the necessary paperwork,
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which Respondent signed, and which paperwork was then
filed with the R.eal Estate Division.

Respondent's

real estate broker!s license fees and bond were paid
for by Appellant.

T. 30, 31, 152, and Ex. 20.

On December 20, 1972, at the time Appellant
requested and Respondent agreed to activate her real
estate broker's license, no mention was made by anyone
of any commission or other compensation to be paid to
Respondent for her acting as a real estate broker for
Appellant's sales organization, and there was no express
agreement, written or oral, between the parties that
any such commission or compensation would be paid.
T. 34, 69, 84, 153.

The Trial Court took judicial notice

of the fact that Rule 19 of the Rules and Regulations
issued by the Real Estate Division of the Department
of Business Regulation requires that real estate brokers
are required to provide their salesmen with the written
terms of their employment arrangement in order to avoid
any misunderstanding.

T. 224, 225. Respondent admits

that she should have insisted on a written agreement
between her and Appellant with respect to any commissions or compensation due her for her acting as a real
estate broker for Appellant's sales organization.
T. 84.
Shortly after December 20, 1972, Appellant
completed the necessary paperwork to open a real estate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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broker's trust account for which Respondent would be
responsible, and both Appellant and Respondent signed
the signature card.

Appellant alone provided the

funds necessary to make the initial deposit in the
trust account, and no additional monies were ever
deposited in the account.

T. 35, 68, 69.

Effective December 29, 1972, amendments to
the aforesaid October 20, 1972, securities registration and prospectus were amended as planned, and
Treasure Mountain Corporation and Appellant entered
into the anticipated agreement pursuant to which
Appellant would act as an independent contractor to
market the subject real estate securities.

T. 45, 46,

48, and Ex. 7, 12.
Effective January 1, 1973, Respondent became
the real estate broker for Appellant's sales organization, and Appellant and two other salesmen held real
estate licenses under her.

On January 1, 1973, Appel-

lant held the securities broker-dealer's license for
Appellant's sales organization and Respondent and two
other salesmen were licensed for securities purposes
under him.

Respondent continued to be licensed as a

securities salesman under Appellant until June, 1973.
One additional salesman was licensed under both Appellant and Respondent about February 1, 1973.
149, 150, and Ex. 1.
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T. 7, 8,

After January 1, 1973, and continuing until
February 19, 1973, Respondent incurred the risks incidental to "brokering11 for Appellant's sales organization.

T. 82. Other than being the responsible real

estate broker for up to four real estate salesmen,
Respondent's duties between January 1 and February 19,
1973, were the same as they were both before and after
that period of time.

T. 65, 85, 156, 157.

Between January 1, 1973, and February 19,
1973, the office space, office furniture, and office
utilities and telephone service used by Appellant!s
sales organization, including Respondent in her capacity as a real estate broker, were provided without
charge by Treasure Mountain Corporation.
Between January 1, 1973, and February 19,
1973, Appellant was responsible for the success of his
sales organization, including supervision of all sales
personnel,
T. 64;

T. 149;

conducting weekly sales meetings,

the hiring and payment of a secretary and the

furnishing of stationery, office supplies, etc., T. 137,
150;

and performance of the contractual obligation

he had with Treasure Mountain Corporation, including
making certain that all sales personnel were properly
licensed;

that his sales organization complied with

all applicable laws and regulations, including securities laws, real estate laws, and Interstate Land Sales
Acts;

payment of all personnel; and indemnification
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of Treasure Mountain Corporation with respect to the
form of the Securities Registration Statements and
Prospectus.

Ex. 12.

Between January 1, 1973, and February 19,
1973, sales made by Appellant's sales organization
were considered made when deposits were received
and/or sales agreements were signed, T. 37, 116; but
commissions were not considered earned until the sale
was closed.

Forty-two sales were made during that

period of time but none of them were closed.
39, 40, 87, 92, 116, and Ex. 22, 23, 24.

T. 37,

:

As of January 1, 1973, Appellant's sales
organization had a list of approximately 500 names of
persons who had indicated an interest in purchasing
the subject real estate securities as soon as registration thereof was effective and sales personnel were
qualified to sell.

Accordingly, Appellant's sales

organization enjoyed brisk sales activity in January
and February of 1973.

T. 205, 207. The gross sales

price of the real estate securities sold by Appellant's
sales organization between January 1, 1973, and February 19, 1973, was $2,193,050.00, and Treasure Mountain Corporation paid to Appellant a 1% broker's
commission on that gross, or $21,930.50.

Ex. 24.

For that same period of time Respondent earned and was
paid a 2.5% commission on the sale of eighteen of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

subject real estate securities made by her, which
commission amounted to $12,335.00.

T. 186 and Ex. 31.

On February 19, 1973, Appellant's Utah real
estate broker's license became effective, whereupon
Respondent inactivated her real estate broker's license

I

and became licensed as a real estate salesman under
Appellant's license effective the same date. Respondent
continued to act as a real estate salesman under Appellant's real estate broker's license until her employment was terminated by Appellant on May 4, 1973.
T. 35, 153.
No mention of any real estate broker's commission for Respondent was ever made by Respondent
i

or anyone acting on her behalf to Appellant or anyone
acting on his behalf until on or about July 25, 1973,
T. 35, 92, and Ex. 19.
Appellant's overhead for the maintenance
of his sales organization pursuant to his agreement
with Treasure Mountain Corporation amounted to $1,500.00
per month for all of 1973.

T. 137.

The forty-two sales made between January 1,
1973, and February 19, 1973, were closed over a thirteen
month period beginning February 21, 1973, as follows:
Month

No. of Sales Closed

February 1973

2

March 1973

2
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Month /;

No. of Sales Closed

April 1973

1

July 1973

3

August 1973

5

September 1973

1

October 1973

5

November 1973

8

December 1973

9

January 1974

4

February 1974

1

March 1974

1

In Utah, the compensation normally paid to
a real estate broker for the "use" of his broker's
license varies according to the circumstances in each
instance, and sometimes it amounts to less than 5% of
the salesman's commission; and sometimes it might be
$250.00 per year.

T. 78-82.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS CLAIM FOR A REAL ESTATE BROKER'S
COMMISSION IS BASED UPON AN IMPLIED AGREEMENT "AUTHORIZING OR EMPLOYING AN AGENT OR BROKER TO PURCHASE OR
SELL REAL ESTATE FOR COMPENSATION" WITHIN THE MEANING
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OF SECTION 25-5-4(5), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AND
IS THEREFORE UNENFORCEABLE.
From the foregoing Statement of Facts, it
is clear that Respondent was not a party to any written
or oral agreement to pay her the real estate broker's
commission she claims.

Further, the Trial Court, in

its Conclusions of Law, concluded that any such agreement between the parties was implied.

See Conclusions

of Law, Paragraph 1.
Section 25-5-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
provides in pertinent part as follows:
Certain Agreements Void Unless Written
and Subscribed^ In the following cases,
every agreement shall be void unless such
agreement, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party to be charged therewith:

(5) Every agreement authorizing
or employing an agent or broker
to purchase or sell real estate
for compensation.
The opinion in Baugh v. Parley, 112 U. 1,
184

P.2d 335 (1947), contains a helpful discussion of

the meaning and effect of the foregoing statutory
provision as follox^s:
... It provides that any agreement for
the performance of services as a real
estate broker shall be void unless in
writing. The statute is applicable to
contracts implied in law as any other.
In effect, it forbids any recovery for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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services in selling land which are not
provided for by written agreement. See
also Page on the Law of Contracts,
Sec. 1413. [Emphasis added]
The statute now under discussion was
construed by this Court in Case v. Ralph,
56 U. 243, 188 P. 640, 642, where,
speaking through Mr. Justice Frick, we
said:
The Courts generally hold that under
such a statute a real estate broker
or agent cannot recover a commission
for services rendered in either selling
or procuring a purchaser for real
property unless it appears: (1) that
there is an express contract or agreement of authority in which the terms
and conditions of his employment, if
any, and the amount of his commission,
etc., are stated; (2) that such contract be in writing; (3) that in the
absence of such an express contract,
no recovery can be had for the reasonable value of the services rendered^
as upon a quantum meriut, nor forThe
money and time expended for the use
and benefit of the owner of the property.
(Italics added)
And in Watson v. Odell, 58 U. 276, 198 P. 772,
775, 20 A.L.R. 280, we said:
Under our statute, the plaintiff could
recover a commission only by virtue of
a contract. He could not recover as
upon a quantum meruit"! [Citing Case v.
Ralph, Supra.] (Italics added)
See also Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, et
ux., 77 U. 176, 292 P. 915.
In Hale v. Kriesel, 194 Wis. 271, 215, N. W.
227, 228, 56 A.L.R. 780, in construing a
statute similar to ours, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin said:
These statutes leave no opportunity
for the law to imply a contract. They
apply to implied agreements as well as
to those that are express, ... (Italics
added)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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From the foregoing, it is apparent that a
cause of action based on an implied agreement cannot
circumvent the plain language of our statute of
frauds.

However, the Trial Court concluded that an

implied agreement between Respondent and Appellant as
opposed to an implied agreement between Respondent
and Treasure Mountain Corporation, the owner of the
subject real property, does not come within the meaning
and prohibition of the statute. In Anderson v. Johnson,
108 U. 417, 160 P.2d 725 (1945), this Court held that
an oral agreement by a broker to pay commissions to an
unlicensed procurer of listings was not an agreement
which involved any right or interest in land and therefore not made void and unenforceable by the statute of
frauds, but it appears that the Court in Anderson v.
Johnson had reference to a different provision of the
statute of frauds than Section 25-5-4(5), because that
section does not talk in terms of nany right or interest
in land.11

There is no indication in Anderson v. Johnson

that the Court considered the issue of whether the
particular provision relied on by Appellant here
applies to implied agreements like the one claimed
by Respondent.

Accordingly, as near as we can tell,

the question is one of first impression in this Court.
The issue may be quickly decided by considering the plain language of the subsection and two
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propositions:

(1) Note that the provision talks

about "every" agreement "authorizing or employing"
which, of course, broadens the provision to apply to
any agreement providing for compensation to a real estate
broker or agent;

and (2)

If the legislature did not

really mean what the provision clearly says, it would
have been a simple matter to state otherwise.
However, even if one concludes that Section
25-5-4(5) applies only to agreements between real
estate brokers and agents and the owners of real
property, in the case at bar, any implied agreement
Respondent had for compensation was with Appellant as
an agent or alter-ego of the owner of the property.
In support of this proposition, it is important to note
that this is not a case where a licensed real estate
broker orally or impliedly agreed to share commissions
with one of his salesmen or a "finder," nor is it a case
where one licensed real estate broker orally or impliedly
agreed to share commissions with another licensed real
estate broker.

On the contrary, at the time any

implied agreement relied on by Respondent came into
being, Appellant was a licensed real estate salesman
but he was not a licensed real estate broker.

Con-

sequently, Appellant was not in a position to lawfully
act as a real estate broker or receive any compensation
as a real estate broker.

This is well established by
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the following provisions of Utah Code Annotated
(1953):
Section 61-2-1. License Required. It
shall be unlawful for any person, copartnership, or corporation to engage
in the business, act in the capacity of,
advertise, or assume to act as a real
estate broker or a real estate salesman
within this state without first obtaining
a license under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 61-2-18(a). Unlicensed Broker Action for Recovery of Compensation
Prohibited. No person, partnership,
association, or corporation shall bring
or maintain action in any Court of this
state for the recovery of commission, a fee,
or compensation for any act done or service
rendered, the doing or rendering of which
is prohibited under the provisions of this
act, to other than licensed real estate
brokers, unless such person was duly
licensed hereunder as a real estate broker
at the time of the doing of such act or
the rendering of such service.
Based on the foregoing statutes, at the time
Respondent was acting as a real estate broker for which
she claims compensation, she had no legally enforceable claim for real estate brokerage commissions
against Appellant because he was acting only on behalf
of Treasure Mountain Corporation in requesting her
brokerage services.

Any legally enforceable claim

for real estate broker's commissions during the time
Respondent's real estate broker!s license was in
effect would had to have been between Respondent and
Treasure Mountain Corporation, the owner of the propYet, she had no written agreement with Treasure
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mountain Corporation, as required by Section 25-5-4(5),
so any implied agreement she had is simply unenforceable.

To hold otherwise seems to us to make Section

25-5-4(5) meaningless, because even if Appellant had
entered into a written agreement with Respondent, he
could have done no more than make her a real estate
broker of the owner's property.

She certainly could

not have been a real estate broker for Appellant with
respect to the subject property, because he didn't
own it.

In Paragraph 7 of the December 29, 1972,

agreement between Treasure Mountain Corporation and
Appellant, Appellant covenanted as follows:
To obtain and at all times during the
term hereof maintain in full force and
effect a license issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended
(the "Exchange Act"), as a broker-dealer
and licenses covering all Salesmen as
securities Salesmen pursuant to the
Exchange Act, as well as all other licenses
and permits necessary to comply with
applicable state securities, real estate,
and other laws and relating to all activities of and services rendered by Taylor
and Salesmen hereunder .... Ex. 12,
Paragraph 7(b)
Thus, Appellant had a mandate from and an obligation
to Treasure Mountain Corporation to obtain a real
estate broker to act on behalf of Treasure Mountain
Corporation.

He did just that, and Respondent became

a real estate broker for Treasure Mountain Corporation.
The only problem is, her appointment was not in writing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

as required by our statute.

Therefore, since any

real estate broker's agreement in this case had to
have been between Respondent and Treasure Mountain
Corporation, the owner of the subject real estate
securities, and since any such agreement was not in
writing, even by the most liberal construction of
the provisions of Section 25-5-4(5), any agreement
Respondent had is void and unenforceable.
Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to judgment in his favor, no cause of action.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THERE WAS ANY IMPLIED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
In its Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 1,
the Trial Court concluded that "there was an agreement, implied in fact and in law, that defendant would
pay to plaintiff the reasonable value of her services
as a real estate broker11 between January 1, 1973, and
February 19, 1973.

Technically, if there was any

implied agreement, it could not be both implied-infact and implied-in-law.

A contract implied-in-fact

is based on the agreement of the parties to be inferred
from their words or conduct.

On the other hand,

implied-in-law contracts arise not from any implied
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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agreement of the parties, but by implication of law
in an effort to do justice regardless of any agreement or presumed intention on the part of the parties.
See 66 Am Jur 2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts,
Section 2, and Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F.2d 936 (9th Cir.
1956) at page 939.

However, regardless of whether

the Trial Court's conclusion is measured by the standards for an implied-in-fact contract or the standards
for an implied-in-law contract, for the reasons discussed below, the evidence in this case is insufficient
to support a conclusion that there was either.
In testing the sufficiency of the evidence,
it should be borne in mind with respect to this Point II
on the issue of whether any implied agreement exists,
and Point III on the issue of the reasonable value of
Respondent's services, on appeal of an equity case in
Utah, the Court should review the evidence, and if a
"clear preponderance11 of the evidence on the controlling points favors an Appellant, the Court should either
enter judgment for the Appellant or remand the matter
for further determination of such factual issues.
See Green v. Palfreyman, 109 U. 291, 166 P.2d 215
(1946), amended and rehearing denied 109 U. 303, 175
P.2d 213 (1946).
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A.

THERE WAS NO IMPLIED-IN-FACT AGREEMENT.

The applicable rule with respect to whether
an implied-in-fact contract exists is stated in 17 Am
Jur 2d, Contracts, Section 4, as follows:
... Thus, where a person performs services,
furnishes property, or expends money for
another at the other's request, and there
is no express agreement as to compensation,
a promise to pay the reasonable value of
the services or property or to reimburse
for money expended may properly be implied
where, but only where, the circumstances
warrant such an inference. [Emphasis added]
Elaborating on certain circumstances which
do not warrant such an inference, 66 Am Jur 2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts, Section 25, provides
as follows:
Where no compensation is agreed upon in
advance for services requested by and
performed for another, the presumption
that compensation was intended is rebutted
by circumstances which negative such an
intention; and one of such circumstances
is strong self-interest in the outcome of
the transaction by the person furnishing
the services. The inference of a promise
to pay for services is also negatived by
the fact that such services when rendered
under like circumstances customarily are
given without compensation, or where the
circumstances or conduct warrant a contrary
inference or the person benefited has said
or done nothing from which such a promise
may be inferred, or where, at the time the
services were rendered, it was intended,
understood, or agreed that no payment would
be made for them, or where the services
were performed without authority, express
or inferred. [Emphasis added]
The foregoing rules of law have clearly been
adopted in this state, as is apparent from a reading
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of the Court's opinion in McCollum v. Clothier, 121 U.
311, 241 P.2d 648 (1952).

In that case, it was held

that a plaintiff was entitled to recover under an
implied contract for services rendered and expenses
incurred in securing bidders on and buyers of machinery
and equipment sold for the benefit of the defendant.
In so holding, the Court stated:
The rule applicable to the situation is
contained in the Restatement of Agency,
Vol. 2, Sec. 441: "Except where the relationship of the parties, the triviality of
the services, or other circumstances indicate that the parties have agreed otherwise, it is inferred that one who requests
or permits another to perform services
for him as his agent promises to pay for
them.11
The Court went on to say of the rule that it:
... should not be applied to bind one
under implied contract to merely permit
services to be rendered him, or accept
benefits from another, under such circumstances that he may reasonably assume
they were given gratuitously. The law
should not require everyone to keep on
guard against such possibility by warning
persons offering services that no pay is
to be expected. It is therefore essential
that the Court should exercise caution in
imposing the obligations of implied contract, as contrasted to express contract
where the parties have actually defined and
agreed to the terms they are to be bound
by. With such caution in mind, the test
for the Court to apply was: Under all the
evidence, were the circumstances such
that the plaintiff could reasonably assume
he was to be paid, and that the defendant
should have reasonably expected to pay ror
such services" [Emphasis^ added]
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i

What, then, does the evidence in the case
at bar indicate with respect to negativing any impliedin-fact agreement between the parties?

We invite

your attention to the following considerations:
(1) Respondent's strong self-interest in the
result of her complying with Appellant's request to
activate her real estate broker's license negatives any
inference of an implied-in-fact agreement.
Prior to the December 20, 1972, conversation,
when Appellant asked to use Respondent's broker's license and requested that she activate the license for
use of Appellant's sales organization, Respondent knew
the following:
(a) That Appellant and Treasure Mountain
Corporation intended to forthwith enter into an
agreement that would make Appellant's sales
organization the exclusive sales agent for the
subject real estate securities.
(b) That it was intended that she be
one of the sales personnel in Appellant's sales
organization.
(c) That there was a large list of
prospective purchasers of the real estate securities, which purchasers could not be contacted by
Appellant's sales personnel until such securities were properly registered and such sales
personnel were properly licensed.
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(d) That the salesmen making the sales
of the real estate securities would receive a
2.57o sales commission on each such sale.
(e) That she would not be able to sell
any of the real estate securities and earn the
2.5% sales commission unless she or someone other
than Appellant acted as a real estate broker for
Appellant's sales organization until such time
as Appellant could qualify for his own real estate
broker's license.
Knowing what she knew, her quick willingness to comply
with Appellant's request to use her real estate broker's
license was extremely prudent in view of the fact that
during the fifty-day period of time her real estate
broker's license was in effect, Respondent personally
sold eighteen of the condominiums or real estate
securities, and as a result of such sales, earned a
commission of $12,335.00.

Under such circumstances,

can there be any doubt that Appellant was justified
in reasonably assuming that Respondent's compliance
with his request was gratuitous?

What real estate

salesman wouldn't have complied unhesitatingly, without promise of any additional compensation, in view of
Respondent's prospects.

In the language of McCollum

v. Clothier, this Court has held that a court should
"exercise caution in imposing the obligations of implied
contract."

With such caution in mind, the only reasonable
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conclusion is that Respondent's self-interest in this
case was too strong to support any implied-in-fact
agreement.
(2)

The intentions of the parties with

respect to compensation were clearly contrary to each
other.
As was said in Rasmussen v. United States Steel
Co., 1 U.2d 291, 265 P.2d 1002 (1954), and restated
with approval in Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651
(Utah 1974):
... The distinction between express and
implied in fact contracts largely is a
difference only in mode of expression. A
contract is express or implied by reason
of the expression of offer and acceptance,
--whether there is a manifestation of mutual
assent, by words or actions or both, which
reasonably are interpretable as indicating
an intention to make a bargain with certain
terms or terms which reasonably may be made
certain. The elements are basically identical in both cases, although the evidentiary
facts may be expressed differently. ...
[Emphasis added]
From the foregoing authority, it is obvious
that whether one concludes that a contract is express
or implied-in-fact, there must be a manifestation of
mutual assent between the parties.

In the case of

the implied-in-fact agreement, such mutual assent
must be inferable from some words or conduct short of
an expressed agreement.

We cannot find any evidence

in the record now before the Court from which it
appears that any mutual assent on the part of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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parties with respect to compensation of Respondent may
be inferred.

On the contrary, Respondent's own testi-

mony clearly negates any notion that there was any
mutual assent with respect to what Respondent was to
receive as compensation.

At trial, with respect to

the December 20, 1972, conversation with Appellant,
in response to questions from her own counsel, Respondent testified as follows:
(0) Mrs. Fowler, was there any discussion
with respect to brokerage commissions?
(A) He only said that it was good for me
to activate my license.
(Q)

So the subject wasn't mentioned at all?

(A) No, not at all.
the subject.

He didn't approach

(Q) At that time, what expectations did
you have, if any, respecting commissions?
(A) Well, all the sales for Treasure
Mountain Corporation had been done on the
premises that the broker will get 1%
commission on all sales.
(Q) And that was your expectation?
(A) And that was my expectation. He was a
salesman and I was a broker, and I expected
to be paid as a broker.
T. 34, 35.
In the face of that testimony, the Trial Court nonetheless inferred that notwithstanding Respondent's
expressed intention to take the full 1% brokerage commission, she and Appellant impliedly mutually agreed
that she be paid the reasonable value of her services.
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If Respondent had testified that she expected
to be paid a "reasonable amount11 or if she had testified that she expected to be paid "something,11 then
the Trial Court may have had some reasonable basis for
concluding as it did.

However, it is obvious that the

Trial Court did not feel that the full 1% commission
was the reasonable value of Respondent's services,
because the Trial Court awarded Respondent approximately $12,000.00 less than what she had stated she
intended to receive.

Thus, the Trial Court's own

finding as to the reasonable value of the services
performed is directly contrary to the proposition that
there was any mutual assent on the part of the parties.
Such conclusion can be reached without bothering to
point out that Appellant clearly did not intend to
pay Respondent the full 17o broker's commission, and at
the same time put up his securities broker-dealer's
license and pay out of his own pocket all of the expenses incidental to running his sales organization,
other than those expenses paid for or incurred by
Treasure Mountain Corporation.

Surely, no one can

believe that Appellant intended that Pvespondent be paid
the full 1% broker's commission.

Accordingly, Respond-

ent's own testimony confirms the lack of any mutual
assent sufficient to serve as the foundation for an
implied-in-fact agreement.
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If Respondent were permitted to prevail in
spite of her own testimony, in other words, if Respondent really intended to take the whole 1% of the brokerage commissions for herself, can anyone believe that
if she had revealed that to Appellant, he would have
agreed to pay her that amount?

How then can we permit

her to collect even one-half of that amount on the
theory of an implied-in-fact contract when she admits
that that is not what she intended.

If we permit her

to collect even one-half of that amount, such recovery
becomes the result of the fact that she was clairvoyant
enough or lucky enough to have simply kept quiet about
the matter of compensation at the time Appellant
requested her services as a real estate broker.

She

thus is permitted to accomplish by her silence what
she clearly would not have been able to accomplish
had she been forthright enough to express her intentions
to Appellant.
(3) By Respondent's own admission, there
was no agreement between her and Appellant with respect
to her compensation as a real estate broker.
At trial, Respondent further testified on
cross-examination as follows:
(Q) I would like to know, Mrs. Fowler,
exactly what discussions you and Mr. Taylor
had about payment of commissions from
January 1 of [sic] February 19, 1973.
(A) Mr. Taylor was very inaccessible to me.
He came to the office just like a breeze.
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(Q) Was there any agreement between you?
(A) No, there was no agreement. The only
agreement was that all the things that he
had filed with the real estate division-(Q) You mean the State Real Estate Division?
(A) --the State Real Estate Division that
he had knowledge that he was a salesman under
me. T. 69.
Here, Respondent clearly admits that there was no
agreement between her and Appellant other than the
documents on file with the State Real Estate Division,
which, of course, had nothing to do with Respondent's
compensation as a real estate broker.

See Ex. 1.

Here again, then, Respondent has clearly admitted that
there was no mutual assent between the parties with
respect to her compensation as a real estate broker.
While Respondent may still be heard to contend that the
law in the interest of justice should allow her recovery
on an implied-in-law theory, her own testimony is such
that there was no implied-in-fact agreement between the
parties.
(4) There can be no implied-in-fact contract
in the event that the law with respect to such agreement
has not been complied with.
Section 61-2-5(b) of the Utah Code Annotated
(1953) speaking of the powers of the State Securities
Commission provides as follows:
(b) The Commission is vested with the power
and authority to make and enforce such rules
and regulations connected with the application
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for any broker's or salesmanTs license, and
the revocation or suspension thereof, as
shall be deemed necessary to administer and
enforce the provisions of this chapter.
Pursuant to such rule-making authority, the Securities
Commission, through the Real Estate Division of the
Department of Business Regulation, adopted the following
rule with respect to real estate brokers and salesmen:
19. Broker-Salesman Disputes. Brokers are
required to treat salesmen and other brokers
ethically and in accordance with good,
accepted business practices. Brokers are
required to provide salesmen with the terms
of employment in writing to avoid misunderstanding.
...

[Emphasis added]

The Trial Court took judicial notice of the
fact that the foregoing Rule 19 was applicable to the
present controversy.
Speaking to the issue of whether an impliedin-fact contract can be inferred without fully complying
with all of the laws pertaining thereto, this Court
stated, in 1974, in Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d
at page 654, that Mno contractual liability can be
created without compliance with11 the applicable ordinances.

In the face of that holding, and in view of

the fact that any implied agreement Respondent had with
Appellant was in her capacity as a real estate broker
and in his capacity as a real estate salesman, in view
of the fact that the above-quoted Rule 19 requires the
broker, not the salesman, to reduce the terms of their
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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agreement to writing,' and in view of the fact that at
trial, Respondent testified upon cross-examination as
follows:
(Q) And with your knowledge of real estate,
Mrs. Fowler, can you explain to me why on
January 1, 1973, that you didn't insist upon
a written contract of some type with Mr. Taylor
to take care of your brokerage fee, such as
you did on February 29 of 1973?
(A)

It was his idea.

It wasn't mine.

(Q) What was the reason why you didn't
do this on January 1 of 1973, with you and
Mr. Taylor or the other salesmen?
(A) I should have done it. There was no
time to discuss it with Mr. Taylor. He came
in with the papers ready to be signed. He
had negotiated everything. It was all
arranged. All I did, as I could see the
papers, was sign, because those papers had
to be submitted to the real estate division
before the 31st of December.
it surely cannot be said that any implied-in-fact agreement relied on by Respondent complied with theother
relevant provisions of State law.
Furthermore, from a purely equitable point of
view, Respondent's failure to reduce to writing any understanding on her part with respect to her compensation as
a real estate broker makes it unconscionable that she be
permitted to have failed to discharge such duty, wait
another seven months before the matter is ever discussed,
claim a $21,930.50 fee based on her unilateral intention, and then recover $9,715.25.

It wasn't until

July 25, 1973, that the subject was ever broached, and
not only was that seven months after the December 20,
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conversation, it was five months after she was no longer
a real estate broker for AppellantTs sales organization,
and two and a half months after her employment with
Appellant was terminated.

It is also important to note

that five real estate securities sales for which she
claims she was entitled to a real estate broker!s
commission were closed between February 21, 1973, and
April 30, 1973, and still she made no demand for the
real estate broker's commission with respect to those
sales

until July 25, 1973, and then through her attorney

she demanded the full 1% commission.
23, 24.

See Ex. 19, 22,

Given that kind of dilitoriness, a "clear

preponderance" of the evidence could lead one to believe
that the idea of claiming a real estate broker's commission at all was an afterthought.

However, that need

not be decided because whether it was an afterthought or
not, to wait so long to raise the issue was clearly
inequitable and negatives any inference that Appellant
agreed to pay Respondent anything for the use of her
real estate broker's license.
B.

THERE IS NO IMPLIED-IN-LAW AGREEMENT.

On the issue of whether the Trial Court was
justified in concluding that there was an implied-inlaw agreement between the parties, that is, whether
the equities were such that notwithstanding any manifestation of mutual assent on the part of the parties,
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the law should nonetheless imply that such a contract
existed in the interest of justice, we direct your
attention to two Utah cases previously cited in this
Brief.

In Baugh v. Parley, cited earlier in Point I

with respect to the statute of frauds issue, the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover for unjust enrichment.

(The terms "unjust enrichment," "quasi-contracts,"

"contracts implied in law," and "restitution" are largely
interchangeable.

See 66 Am Jur 2d, Restitution and

Implied Contracts, Sections 1, 2, and 3.)
in

The facts

Baugh v. Parley were that the defendant had orally

agreed to sell certain real property to the plaintiff,
and the plaintiff in turn had located a buyer that
was willing to pay plaintiff a higher price for the
same property.

Upon discovering

that plaintiff!s

buyer was willing to pay the higher price, the defendant refused to sell to the plaintiff, then sold to the
plaintiff's buyer and refused to pay anything to the
plaintiff.

In holding that the plaintiff could not

recover for unjust enrichment, the Court stated at 184
P.2d 337, "Unjust enrichment

of a person occurs when

he has and retains money or benefits which in justice
and equity belong to another."

The Court then went on

to say:
The mere fact that a person benefits another
is not of itself sufficient to require the
other to make restitution therefor. Restatement of Restitution, Section 1, Comment C.
Services officiously or gratuitously furnished
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are not recoverable. Restatement of Restitution, Section 2. Nor are services performed by the plaintiff for his own advantage
and from which the defendant benefits incidentally , recoverable] See Restatement of
Restitution, Section 40, Comment C; and Section
41(a)(i). [Emphasis added]
In Rapp v. Salt Lake City, cited previously with respect
to the issue of whether there was an implied-in-fact
agreement in this

case, this Court stated as recently

as 1974 as follows, at 527 P.2d 654:
In effect, plaintiff's argument on appeal
is directed toward enforcing a quasicontractual obligation, which is imposed
by the law for the purpose of bringing about
justice without reference to the intention
of the parties. Such obligations are not
true contracts but are based on unjust
enrichment or restitution. The promise is
purely fictitious and is implied in order
to fit the actual cause of action to the
remedy. The liability exists from an implication of law that arises from the facts
and circumstances independent of agreement
or presumed intention. Where the facts
indicate a duty of the defendant to pay,
the law imputes to him a promise to fulfill
that obligation. In states distinguishing
actions of contract from actions of tort, a
proceeding at law for restitution is an
action of contract. Thus again plaintTff
encounters the statutory requirements which
mandate his contractual obligation is void
without fulfillment of the requisiEe
formalities. [Emphasis added]
Applying the foregoing authorities to the facts
in the case at bar, at trial, Respondent did not prove
the existence of an implied-in-law agreement, for the
following reasons:
(1) Respondent's services were gratuitous
and self-serving and were performed for her own substanDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As has been stated earlier, with respect to
whether Respondent proved an implied-in-fact agreement,
Respondent making her real estate broker's license
available at the request of Appellant was to her own
substantial advantage and complying with such request
was incidental to the benefits she received.

At the

time of Appellant's request, if Appellant had stated to
Respondent that he was not willing to pay her any compensation for the use of her real estate broker's
license, can it really be doubted that she would not
have gone ahead and put up her license in order to
insure that she would have been able to sell the subject real estate securities as soon as the registration
thereof became effective, and earn the $12,335.00 she
received for the sales she personally made between
January 1, 1973, and February 19, 1973.
(2) There can be no implied-in-law contract
without fulfillment of the requisite formalities.
The law does not permit the creation of an
implied-in-law agreement without compliance with the
requisite formalities, any more than the law permits
the creation of implied-in-fact agreement without such
compliance.

In addition to what we have said earlier,

with respect to implied-in-fact agreements, note that
this Court in Rapp v. Salt Lake City, speaking with
respect to implied-in-law agreements, said that such
"contractual obligation is void without fulfillment of
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

• -35-'' V

the requisite formalities."

Thus, Respondent's failure

to comply with Rule 19 of the applicable rules and regulations of the State Securities Commission pertaining
to real estate brokers and salesmen clearly makes
Respondent's "unjust enrichment" claim unenforceable.
Aside from the formal technicalities of such
a holding, such a holding is entirely just and equitable.

Why should Respondent, who played the role of the

real estate broker in this whole matter, be absolved of
her legal responsibility for putting the agreement, if
any, in writing; be permitted to remain silent with
respect to the matter of her compensation for over seven
months and then come to court and recover $9,715.25
from one of the real estate salesmen licensed under
her.
(3) Justice does not require Appellant to
compensate Respondent for herservices.
After activating her real estate broker's
license as requested by Appellant, the evidence is
uncontroverted that Respondent performed no services
for Appellant that she did not perform prior to activating her license, except (a) she opened (but never
used) a real estate broker's trust account with a bank;
and (b) she took the risk of being responsible for the
real estate sales activities of three to four real
estate salesmen for a period of fifty days.

-36-
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On the other hand, Appellant took all of the
executive, management, and supervisory responsibility,
and entrepreneurial risk with respect to the whole
sales operation that benefited both of them.
He, not she, paid the fees for her real
estate broker's license and bond.
He, not she, put up the money for the initial
and only deposit in her real estate broker's trust
account.
He, not she, bargained for and negotiated the
agreement giving his sales organization, including
her, something to sell.
He, not she, incurred the contractual obligation to perform the agreement with Treasure Mountain
Corporation, including making certain that all sales
personnel were properly licensed; that his sales organization complied with all applicable laws and regulations,
including securities laws, real estate laws, and interstate land sales acts; payment of all personnel in his
sales organization; and indemnification of Treasure
Mountain Corporation with respect to the form of the
securities registration statements and prospectus.
He, not she, supervised the sales organization.
He, not she, conducted weekly sales meetings.
He, not she, hired and paid for a secretary.
He, not she, paid all of the expenses of the
sales office other than those expenses paid for or
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incurred by Treasure Mountain Corporation, and such
net expenses attributable to earning the 1% brokerfs
commission were $1,500.00 per month for all of 1973. .
He, not she, took the risk of closing all of
the sales on which she claims a real estate broker's
commission, because all of such sales were closed
when he was the responsible real estate broker.
All of the foregoing Appellant did without
requesting or receiving any indemnification from
Respondent.
All of the foregoing Appellant did during a
time when Respondent certainly was not indispensable,
because Appellant had a real estate broker friend who
was willing to broker for him without receiving any
compensation therefor, and there was in Appellant's
sales organization another real estate salesman who
was eligible to activate his real estate broker's
license to broker for the organization.
Based on the foregoing considerations, the
record in this case is not such as to support a conclusion that the law ought to create an implied-in-law
agreement in the interest of justice.
It also appears that regardless of whether
one is determining Respondent's rights by whether there
was an implied-in-fact or an implied-in-law agreement,
the record does not support the Trial Court's conclusion that there was either one, let alone both.
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For

the same reasons, the Court should enter judgment in
favor of Appellant and against Respondent, no cause of
action.
POINT III
1

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND CON-

CLUDING THAT THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE SERVICES
PERFORMED BY RESPONDENT WAS $9,715.25.
The record makes clear that Treasure Mountain
Corporation paid Appellant gross brokerage commissions
in the amount of $21,930.50 for the period between
January 1, 1973, and February 19, 1973.

The Trial Court

found that between those dates Appellant incurred expenses in the amount of $2,500.00 and that therefore
the net brokerage commissions recovered by Appellant
for the subject period of time amounted to $19,430.50.
The Trial Court further found that the reasonable value
of the services performed by Respondent was one-half of
such net commissions, or $9,715.25, and then concluded
as a matter of law that Respondent's measure of recovery
was said reasonable value of her services.

See Con-

clusions of Law, Paragraph 2.
Appellant has no quarrel with the Trial Court'
conclusion that Respondent's measure of recovery in
this case, if she is entitled to any recovery at all,
is the reasonable value of her services.

In Utah, it

appears that the measure of recovery is the same regardl
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of whether the implied contract on which recovery is
predicated is said to be implied-in-fact or impliedin-law.

As was said in Baugh v. Parley, Supra, with

respect to an implied-in-law count:

I!

. . . in an action

for unjust enrichment, in those cases where there is a
proper equitable basis for the same, the measure of
damages, by the great weight of authority, is the reasonable value of the services rendered."

Likewise, in

Wooldridge v. Wareing, 120 U. 514, 236 P.2d 341 (1951),
this Court held with respect to implied-in-fact contracts
that the law
... requires that he who accepts service from
him who unofficiously performs under circumstances justifying the latter in reasonably
assuming he would be compensated must pay the
reasonable value thereof. As is more clearly
explained by Professor Williston in Section 41
of his monumental work on contracts, "It is by
no means uncommon for those who offer or agree
to employ others or to buy goods, to make no
statement as to the wages or price to be paid.
The law invokes here (as likewise where an
agreement is indefinite as to time) the standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, the fair
value of the services or property is recoverable on the implied in fact contract.
A year later, in McCollum v. Clothier, Supra, the Court
held that there was an implied contract requiring the
defendant to pay for the reasonable value of the plaintiff's services.

Again in 1964, in Richards and Soren-

son v. Lake Hills, 15 U.2d 150, 389 P.2d 66 (1964),
this Court affirmed the Trial Court's decision allowing
recovery on an implied agreement to pay reasonable compensation and allowed recovery "on the basis of usual
charges for such services."
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Based upon the foregoing, it appears that
whether you call the measure of recovery nthe reasonable value of services rendered,M the "usual charges
for such services,'1 or "unjust enrichment," the result
is the same.

For example, if a property owner accepts

improvements to his property that cost his benefactor
$5,000.00 but appreciates the value of his property by
$10,000.00, the property owner has been unjustly enriched only to the extent of $5,000.00 or the reasonable value of his benefactor's services.
Applying the foregoing rules of law to this
case, what is the reasonable value of the services
Respondent performed pursuant to any implied agreement?
At trial, no one, not Respondent, not Appellant,
nor any expert witness, rendered any opinion as to the
reasonable value of Respondent's services in light of
all the circumstances of this case.

Robert Monson, an

experienced Utah real estate broker, testified that
the compensation that should be paid a real estate
broker for the use of his license depends on the circumstances of the situation; that he had brokered for
a third party on one occasion for a whole year for a
fee of $250.00;

that he personally would have brokered

for Appellant in this case without any compensation;
but he was never asked what was the custom in the industry for compensating a real estate broker under the
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circumstances of this case.

Respondent herself testi-

fied that she intended to get the whole 1% broker's
commission.

However, as noted above, what she intended

to recover has nothing to do with the measure of recovery
but only whether the parties could reasonably be said to
have intended any agreement to pay compensation in the
first place.

In short, no one testified that it is the

custom in the real estate industry in the state of Utah,
given the facts and circumstances of this case, to
equally split the net securities and real estate brokerage commissions received.

Accordingly, Respondent

simply did not carry the plaintiff's burden of proof
with respect to proving the reasonable value of Respondent's services.

At the very least, then, we contend

that Appellant is entitled to a new trial on that
issue.
In the alternative, we request an order and
judgment holding that the reasonable value of Respondent's real estate broker's services for the time in
question is zero or no more than $250.00. There is
justification for the latter holding, based on the
evidence in the record that Mr. Monson would have
performed the same services as Respondent without any
charge to Appellant and that he had "brokered" for a
third party for a year's time for $250.00.

Respondent

brokered for Appellant for only fifty days.
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A new trial; or such reduction in the amount
of the judgment seems to be supported by the Court's
opinion in Wooldridge v. Wareing, Supra, wherein on
the issue of the amount of the recovery for breach of
an implied-in-fact contract, the Court said:
Since the trial Court found there was no
express contract between the parties, and
since both parties concur, we must determine
whether the $4,000.00 award was based on
any substantial evidence. Plaintiff contended the award should have been far greater,
and defendant asserted it should have been
much less, or nothing at all. Both sides
discussed at length "net profits," "50-50
split," "sales discount," and the like, but
the record discloses that the sales price
of [the] equipment on the ... sale was almost
exactly $80,000.00, 5% of which would be
$4,000.00, the amount adjudged by the Court.
The only uncontroverted satisfactory evidence of value for services rendered in
similar cases was elicited by defendant's
own expert witness, who testified that the
customary commission paid in industry to a
casual dealer who assists in effecting a
sale was 5% of the sale price of the equipment, which testimony, taken together with
other evidence adduced, is sufficient to
justify the award. [Emphasis added]
At the case at bar there is no evidence in
the record discussing the "50-50 split" used by the
Trial Court in arriving at the amount of the judgment,
nor is there any evidence as to the custom in any case
where securities broker-dealer and real estate broker
commissions are to be shared.
Further, even if the Trial Court concluded
correctly that the reasonable value of Respondent's
real estate broker's services was equivalent to one-half
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of the net commissions received by Appellant, the
record is clear that Appellant's net commissions were
far less than the $19,430.50 found by the Trial Court.
The evidence is uncontroverted that Appellant incurred
expenses attributable to earning securities and real
estate brokerage commissions at the rate of $1,500.00
per month for all of 1973.

The evidence is also

uncontroverted that not one single sale on which such
brokerage commissions were paid was closed during the
period between January 1, 1973, and February 19, 1973.
This means that in order for Appellant to have grossed
the $21,930.50 in brokerage commissions he received,
all of which was received between February 21, 1973, and
sometime in March of 1974, he incurred expenses at the
rate of $1,500.00 per month at least through 1973.i
Accordingly, rather than being given credit for $2,500,00
in expenses for January 1, 1973, to February 19, 1973,
Appellant should have been given credit for expenses
in the amount of $1,500.00 for the twelve months of
1973, or $18,000.00.

If Appellant is given credit

for such expenses, the net commissions he received for
the period in question were only $3,930.50, one-half of
which would be $1,965.25.
Such calculation does not take into consideration any of Appellant's expenses with respect to closing
the six sales that were closed in 1974.

Accordingly,

at the very most, Respondent would be entitled to
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recover $1,965.25 as the reasonable value of her real
estate broker's services for the period in question.
Based on the foregoing, Appellant requests an
order granting a new trial on the issue of the reasonable value of Respondent's services, or requests an
order reducing the amount of Respondent's recovery to
zero or $250.00 or $1,965.25.

CONCLUSION
Because the applicable provisions of the
Utah Statute of Frauds makes any implied agreement
between the parties void and unenforceable, and
because the Trial Court erred in concluding that there
was an implied-in-fact and/or implied-in-law agreement
between the parties, Appellant is entitled to a judgment in his favor and against Respondent, no cause of
action as a matter of law.

In the alternative, Appel-

lant is entitled to a new trial on the issue of the
reasonable value of Respondent's services to Appellant,
or an order reducing the amount of the judgment to
zero or $250.00 or $1,965.25.

Respectfully submitted,
Kent B Linebaugh
JARDINE, JOHNSON AND BALDWIN
700 Commercial Security Bank
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
532-7700
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 1st day of April, 1976, two copies
of this Brief of Appellant were served upon counsel for
Plaintiff-Respondent by delivering such copies to the
office of Bryce Roe, of Roe and Fowler, at 340 East
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
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